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6413 version 2. Lawyerdude 541 476 8954. Lawyerdude1989@yahoo.com Dlawyerdude@gmail.com Upgraded Sunday, Oct 23, 2005.
A bad brief re: The Right to drive without any license.
This is a bad brief written by a person ashamed to affix his name to it.
This brief is mere sophistry: 1. Plausible but fallacious argumentation.
2. A plausible but misleading or fallacious argument.
There are only 4 Lenau’s listed in Anywho.com in Michigan.
I don’t know if she won her case.
All of this unknown stuff would be known had she done her brief right and thoroughly.
Although this is a bad brief, it presents many interesting questions.
This page is www.lawyerdude.s5.com/lenau.html
Related pages:
This page is copied from: http://www.freedomlaw.com/LenauRtTravel.htm
This page is listed on my collection of right to drive briefs: http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/right2drive.html
This Lenau brief sucks. Here is how to write a good brief:
How to write a brief: http://www.lawyerdude.s5.com/6435memo.html
Motions 101: How to write a motion: http://www.lawyerdude.netfirms.com/6025.html and
Also, visit my Empowerment Link to download over 100 winning motions from 20 winning pro se litigators:
http://www.circuitlawyer.8m.com/traffic.html
My most aggressive motions were the ones that I wrote for Steve Bloomer a/k/a steve762@juno.com His aggressive motions are at: http://fu.gq.nu/Steve762.html
Please join my newest Yahoo group for discussion or legal self help litigation. Here is the link to the link:
http://www.lawyerdude.8k.com/6346.html
Highlights of this case:
MISSION STATEMENT of Muskegon county courts:
The Mission of the Muskegon County Courts is to provide the public with a fair and impartial forum in which to resolve conflict and to provide services in an effective, efficient and reasonable manner, that is accessible to all citizens
Who is District Court?
The District Court is a trial court of limited jurisdiction. Michigan is divided into 101 judicial districts, ranging in size from a single city or township to multiple counties. The District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the following types of cases:
* Civil suits involving $25,000 or less.
* Adult criminal misdemeanor offenses punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment.
* Civil Infractions/Traffic Violations
* Landlord/Tenant Disputes, such as eviction proceedings.
* Small Claims (Civil Suits involving $3000 or less).
* Land contract forfeitures.
In addition to its jurisdiction to try adult criminal offenses punishable by up to one year’s imprisonment, the District Court is the court in which all other adult criminal proceedings begin, regardless of the nature of the offense. In carrying out this function, the District Court has jurisdiction to :
* Issue arrest and search warrants.
* Set bail and accept bond.
* Conduct misdemeanor and felony arraignments.
* Preside over preliminary examinations for felony offenses.
District Court decisions are generally appealible to the Circuit Court, although a different appeal process applies to informal hearings involving civil traffic infractions, and small claims division.
STATE OF MICHIGAN 60TH DISTRICT COURT
60th District Court
990 Terrace Street
Muskegon, MI 49442
Phone (231) 724-6294
Fax (231) 724-3489
Hours of Operation:
8:30 a.m. - 4:45 p.m., Monday - Friday
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff, Case No. 01-011562-ST
Vs.
ANNA RENE LENAU,
Respondent.
I, Anna-René: Lenau:, Sovereign, Citizen of Michigan, all rights reserved, Submitted to the Lord Jesus Christ, who is the only Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords (1st Timothy 6:15; Isaiah 33:22; Acts 17:7); Respondent, non-attorney litigant in the above captioned case, respectfully submits and replies to and rebuts the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction requesting the defendant’s motion for Dismissal be Denied, line upon line, precept upon precept, which the Plaintiff failed to do in his Response. The motion was called a Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction.
The response by the plaintiff to have the defendant’s motion to dismiss denied is truly feeble at best. Once again, as what seems to be the case in most instances, the prosecutor is in denial. He refuses to address what the defendant in error has continually brought up as the question before the court. How can the state, the legislature, the police powers, the judiciary, or any other governmental or quasi-governmental agency compel or coerce under the color of law a Michigan state Citizen or Sovereign to waive, abrogate, or derogate an unalienable right in order to accept a government privilege or license? This is especially true as it relates to traveling by automobile in one’s own private capacity. Traveling in private property not a commercial entity. The prosecutor refuses to answer or rebut even one of the arguments presented in the motion and the supporting arguments or the averments presented later that the plaintiff calls “Bill of Particulars” which they are not. Silence by the plaintiff is an answer. By his continual denial of addressing the main argument of this sovereign, he becomes party to the treason that is self-evident. Is this a blatant attempt and act of the plaintiff to compel and coerce a sovereign American to abrogate her unalienable rights? It is further well established that no power or authority is vested in any local, state, or national public office which would derogate or abrogate any unalienable right of the sovereign citizens a.k.a. political trustors, for want of the power of the sovereign people themselves to derogate or abrogate any of their unalienable rights in the first instance, or power to delegate such a power of authority in the second place.
Definitions, court cases, and sound reasoning abound in the defendant’s paperwork shows conclusively that the plaintiff’s response has absolutely no legal merit whatsoever. The following is a rebuttal of the plaintiff’s response to the defendant’s Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction.
1. He cites the 10th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Like this somehow gives special powers to the state of Michigan to make slaves of its citizens and deny them their unalienable rights. On the contrary, “the powers… are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Article 1, Section 1 of the Michigan Constitution says, “All political power is inherent in the people.” Why would the people want to give up their sovereign power to accept a privilege unless they thought they were receiving a superior benefit? Why would they want to waive their unalienable rights to receive a license unless it was done under duress, fraud, or some other means?
2. He cites the Michigan state Constitution Article 4, Section 1 regarding the legislative power of the state. Again, how can the legislature in this case abrogate the unalienable rights of its citizens by laws legislated by the senate or the house of representatives? It is impossible if it wants to keep the integrity of its own Constitution. It cannot violate the article 1 unalienable rights of the sovereign Americans recorded in the Michigan Constitution. These will be explained in greater detail later on in this brief.
3. He claims the courts have personal jurisdiction over an individual. First they would have to commit a crime of some kind. Where’s the body of a crime, and injured party, and so forth? Are we talking about an individual, a person, and a corporation, an artificial entity created by the state or a person created by statute? What are we talking about here?
4. He cites MCL 600.701. Once again there has to be a crime committed in order for a process to be served. Even then it is subject to the limitations provided in section 745. There has to be consent. Implied consent is given when the application is filled out to receive the privilege to drive a motor vehicle. All one’s rights are waived as soon as they sit in what they think is their motor vehicle. The plaintiff needs to read MCL 600.775 along with 701, “…except as limited by the constitution.” More on this later.
5 He says the defendant was driving on US31 and was served a ticket at location while present in the State of Michigan and lists as her domicile a Michigan address. The defendant was traveling on US31 in her privately owned automobile (see exhibit – traveling papers) which was presented to the officer that stopped and detained her. She was not present in the State of Michigan, she was traveling in Michigan state on a public highway. There is a big difference between the state of Michigan and Michigan state. The prosecutor will pretend and say that there is no difference, when he clearly knows the difference. The defendant is a sovereign or Christian on the land and not a member of the corporation of the state of Michigan. She is not a resident of the state of Michigan, she lives in Michigan state. [Lawyerdude says: Try to explain that difference to a jury. Sophistry: 1. Plausible but fallacious argumentation. 2. A plausible but misleading or fallacious argument. ] She is not employed here, nor is she registered to vote. She has never had a state issued birth certificate and has never attended public school (home-schooled). She has consistently listed her mailing as in C/O Box 263 or 138 E. Lake St., Sand Lake, Michigan [49343]. This means it is non-domestic mail. Where’s the jurisdiction? Where’s the subject-matter jurisdiction? More on this later.
6-11. He cites case law, which has nothing whatsoever to do with the defendant as will be shown in the following treatise, rebutted in detail in its entirety along with MCL 257.301 and his conclusion (12).
The respondent, Anna-René: Lenau: has never admitted she was operating an motor vehicle without a license in the state of Michigan on January 1, 2001. She was “traveling” in her privately owned automobile as a free Sovereign on the soil (not a resident of Michigan), as a matter of right and free passage and not as a matter of privilege. She was also not engaged in any commercial activity. It is egregious to note that the Prosecutor in his brief never addressed MCL 102.14 Use of Highways and streets clearly cited in the motion and supporting documents. This public act of 1895 was enacted long before an operator’s license statute existed and by the state’s own standards is still being promulgated today. It indicates that the roads can be regulated, but the regulations are “subject (under the authority of) to the right of travel or passage therein.” It states:
“The council may regulate the use of the public highways, streets, avenues and alleys of the city, subject to the right of travel and passage therein. They shall have authority to prescribe the stands for all vehicles kept for hire, or designate the places where wood, coal, hay and other articles may stand for sale; to regulate traffic and sales in the streets and upon sidewalks…” MCL 102.14; MCL 67.23
[Lawyerdude adds: Lenau did not write a statement of the case. Therefore we do not know if she received a ticket in a 4th class city. If she did, then she might have an argument.
Added by Lawyerdude:
THE FOURTH CLASS CITY ACT (EXCERPT)
Act 215 of 1895
102.14 Use of highways and streets.
Sec. 14.
The council may regulate the use of the public highways, streets, avenues and alleys of the city, subject to the right of travel and passage therein. They shall have authority to prescribe the stands for all vehicles kept for hire, or designate the places where loads of wood, coal, hay and other articles may stand for sale; to regulate traffic and sales in the streets and upon sidewalks; to regulate or prohibit the display, use or placing of signs, advertisements and banners, awning posts and telegraph, telephone or light poles and wires in or over the streets; to prohibit immoderate riding and driving in the streets or over bridges; to regulate or prohibit all such sports, amusements, proceedings and gathering of crowds in the streets as may interfere with the lawful use thereof, or render travel or passage therein inconvenient or unsafe; to prohibit and prevent the running at large of beasts and fowls in the streets or elsewhere in the city, and to impose penalties upon the owners or keepers thereof permitting the same; to cleanse and purify the streets; and to prohibit, prevent, remove and abate all nuisances therein, and to require the authors and maintainers thereof to remove the same and to punish them; and generally to prescribe and enforce all such police regulations over and in respect to the public streets, as may be necessary to secure good order and safety to persons and property in the lawful use thereof; and to promote the general welfare; and in addition to all other powers herein granted, the council shall have the same authority and powers over and in respect to the public streets of the city, as are conferred by law upon highway commissioners in townships.
History: 1895, Act 215, Eff. Aug. 30, 1895 ;-- CL 1897, 3186 ;-- CL 1915, 3100 ;-- CL 1929,
THE GENERAL LAW VILLAGE ACT (EXCERPT)
Act 3 of 1895
67.23 Public streets; regulations; enforcement; council; powers.
Sec. 23.
The council may regulate the use of public highways, streets, avenues, and alleys of the village, subject to the right of travel and passage therein. The council may prescribe the stands for all vehicles kept for hire, or used for the transportation of persons or property for hire; designate the places where loads of wood, coal, hay, and other articles may stand for sale; regulate traffic and sales in the streets and upon sidewalks; regulate or prohibit the display, use, or placing of signs, advertisements, banners, awnings, posts, poles, or lamps in or over the streets; regulate or prohibit sports, amusement proceedings, and gatherings of crowds in the streets that may interfere with the lawful use thereof, or render travel or passage therein inconvenient or unsafe; prohibit and prevent the running at large of animals in the streets or elsewhere in the village, and impose sanctions upon the owners or keepers responsible; cleanse and purify the streets; prohibit, prevent, remove, and abate all nuisances in the streets, require a person creating or maintaining a nuisance to remove or abate it, sanction the person for the creation or maintenance of the nuisance, and generally prescribe and enforce regulations concerning the public streets as may be necessary to secure good order and safety to persons and property in their lawful use and to promote the general welfare. In addition, the council shall have the same authority and powers over and in respect to the public streets of the village as are conferred by law upon the board of county road commissioners.
History: 1895, Act 3, Imd. Eff. Feb. 19, 1895 ;-- CL 1897, 2791 ;-- CL 1915, 2662 ;-- CL 1929, 1571 ;-- CL 1948, 67.23 ;-- Am. 1998, Act 255, Imd. Eff. July 13, 1998.
Note that regulations have nothing to do with licensing citizens or sovereigns to travel in privately owned automobiles and the registration of privately owned automobiles. The supporting arguments document to the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction contains the proof that the courts have ruled time and time again showing categorically the marked difference between private and commercial conveyance, automobile and motor vehicle, traveler and operator or driver, unalienable right to travel and licensed privilege to drive, sovereign or citizen and person or corporation. etc. The definitions at law and the courts have spoken. The obligation of the court is the insuring of just settlements of disputes, under the jurisdiction of the laws governing the court. The statutes that the prosecutor is charged with enforcing carefully stipulate that his city DOES NOT have a power of regulating non-commercial travel (unless damage or criminal activity has taken place – the role of police power), and that the statute carefully defines the commercial travel over which they DO have jurisdiction. There is no evidence before this court that either she or her privately owned automobile fall within the narrowly defined jurisdiction of the prosecutor’s authority for enforcement, therefore the prosecutor is failing by not stating a claim for which relief can be granted by this court. This court must dismiss!
By not addressing the clearly worded Support document to the Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, the prosecutor is admitting by default that the definitions used are accurate as defined by law and the supporting court cases that were used. He indicates in his response that she was ticketed by Police Officer Bush for operating a motor vehicle and driving the vehicle without a valid operator’s license.
The Support document to the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction clearly defines the lawful use of the words: operating, motor vehicle, driving, and operator’s license. These words are all used in conjunction with a commercial venue, but not in a private capacity. If she were engaged in some sort of commercial activity while out on the road, then an operator’s license would need to be issued. If she were driving a vehicle, then she would need an operator’s license. In fact, the officer ticketed her in error with no probable cause or indication that she was driving a commercial vehicle. In fact, she proved to the officer in error, that she indeed was not driving a commercial vehicle by her traveling paperwork presented to the officer after the initial stop and encounter.
After the officer stopped and detained the respondent, she produced her traveling paperwork as irrefutable proof that she was acting as a sovereign with free passage upon the thoroughfares of Michigan and elsewhere. The documents which are also included as an exhibit (Signed Apostille by Candice S. Miller, Notice and Demand, Affidavit Revocation of Trust, and the Bill of Sale) in support of the Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction, show how the respondent has no nexus in which any charge can be laid regarding the Michigan Vehicle Code or any other driving activity. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Zarzecki v. Hatch 347 Mich. 138 (1956), a case involving an automobile collision resulting in personal injuries and property damage, “It is admitted by both parties that the contributory negligence of plaintiff, if any, and the negligence of defendant should be governed by the common law as the statutory law and the Michigan Vehicle Code are not applicable to automobile traffic on private property.” So there is room for the common law to govern. There is an admission that the MVC is not applicable to automobile traffic (notice the word automobile used here) on private property.
The defendant took careful, proper, and lawful steps when she purchased what was then a motor vehicle with real property (not commercial paper) and lawfully changed the classification of her now private property into an automobile via Bill of Sale (see Bill of Sale). She then proceeded to remove all adhesion contracts from previous owners and revoked the trusteeship of the State of Michigan that was connected to the previously classified motor vehicle by affidavit using Michigan Compiled Law: MCL 556.118 Release of powers; method; delivery. [M.S.A. 26.155(108)]. After completing these steps, the defendant went to Michigan’s Office of the Great Seal and had her documents Sealed by Apostille signed by Candice Miller. Her documents included a Notice and Demand cover for filing purposes with the Michigan State Motor Vehicles Department. On October 3, 2000, the defendant sent all these documents to Lansing certified/receipt mail to the State of Michigan Vehicle Records Division. The automobile was hers, privately owned, no different than “household goods”. The automobile as real private property cannot be assessed or taxed MCL 211.9. This is how the Supreme Court has ruled on this:
“Motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property and cargo;... “Used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit[.]” 18 U.S.C. 31
“A carriage is peculiarly a family or household article. It contributes in a large degree to the health, convenience, comfort, and welfare of the householder or of the family.” Arthur v Morgan, 113 U.S. 495, 500, 5 S.Ct. 241, 243 (S.D. NY 1884).
“The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.” Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907). “A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his “household goods[.]” U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases - Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94.”
Did the prosecutor take into account the exhibit (Signed Apostille by Candice S. Miller, Notice and Demand, Affidavit Revocation of Trust, and the Bill of Sale) that accompanied the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction? Did he take into account the lawful steps that were taken in order to properly privatize the Accused in error’s automobile long before the officer issued her a citation? By his silence in this matter he is agreeing that all the aforementioned lawful documents as they were presented to the officer are true, lawful, and complete. The plaintiff is dealing with a true sovereign, a free woman of the soil with no adhesion contracts with government of any kind (no state issued birth certificate, no social security number, no licenses of any kind, no government contracts). She is not an enfranchised fourteenth amendment citizen. She is not a citizen of the state of Michigan. She is an Article 1, Section 1 Sovereign Citizen of Michigan (one of the people) who retains all her unalienable or inalienable rights all of the time, not waiving any of her rights at any time. She fully functions and operates under the authority of God’s law and the common law (Article 1, Section 23 of the Michigan Constitution) protected by the bill of rights in both the Michigan Constitution and the Constitution of the united States of America.
What is the nature of the charge or the crime that the defendant in error is being accused of? Where is the body of the crime, the corpus delicti? Where are the verified complaint(s) from victims, the witnesses, the testimony and the evidence that any damage to any property was done or has taken place? If the prosecution can’t produce any, then what is this sovereign, the Accused being charged with?
Does the Prosecutor, in the instant case, comply with the Michigan Rules of Criminal Procedure, if the instant charge is alleged to be a misdemeanor or a felony crime? Has he included a sworn testimony along with a verified complaint that a crime has been committed? Are the Rules of Criminal Procedure being changed according to this case? Again, who has been damaged in this alleged incident? Where are the victim(s), testimony, witnesses, and evidence that any injury or damage to property has occurred?
The plaintiff has neglected to answer or rebut even one single averment contained in the Defendant’s Certified Demand to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation, therefore, each and every averment is now deemed to be true as admitted. Here again, the plaintiff has neglected to answer or rebut even one averment in the Defendant’s Affirmed Demand to Dismiss for Want of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Every averment therein is now deemed to be true as admitted. That is the law.
The defendant raises a question before the court (a question looking for an answer) of possible fraud being perpetrated upon the people of Michigan through the motor vehicle registration certificate at this hearing. The question is a valid one because of MCL 257.219 in the Michigan Vehicle Code. If the application contains a false or fraudulent statement, then the issuance of registration or transfer of registration can be refused by the secretary of state (more on this latter).
Another question before the court is whether or not the MVC is based on administrative law?
The prosecutor failed to answer in his response brief the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction that was obviously raised in the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction. By the prosecutor’s virtual silence on this issue, he is admitting that the court and the state of Michigan has no jurisdiction over her body or her privately owned automobile. By doing so, he is also ignoring the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction for which there is no excuse or immunity.
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, the court cannot proceed when it clearly appears that the court lacks jurisdiction, the court has no authority to reach merits, but, rather should dismiss the action." Melo v. US., 505 F 2d 1026
"There is no discretion to ignore lack of jurisdiction." Joyce v. U.S. 474 2D 215
"The burden shifts to the court to prove jurisdiction"
Rosemond v. Lambert, 469 F 2d 416
"Court must prove on the record, all jurisdiction facts related to the jurisdiction asserted." Latana v. Hopper, 102 F. 2d 188;
Chicago v. New York 37 F Supp. 150
The prosecutor is admitting by his silence, the undisputed jurisdictional fact that the ACCUSED, the defendant in error, is being charged unlawfully. It is a verified fact that the ACCUSED, Anna-René: Lenau: is not subject for want of a nexus connecting her to the said statute/ordinances, namely, the Motor Vehicle Code in the first instance, and notwithstanding the want of the legislature of the State of Michigan to convert any unalienable right of the ACCUSED into a privilege in any case. By evidence, witnesses, and testimony the court knows it has no subject-matter jurisdiction.
Does the plaintiff think jurisdiction is acquired by the simple act of filling out a traffic citation as a “criminal charge” against the defendant, a sovereign citizen of Michigan? Courts have held traffic citations are insufficient as an indictment or information:
“Held, that a uniform traffic ticket is not sufficient information to be used as a pleading and held that the absence of verified information was a jurisdictional defect which could not be waived by a plea of guilty.”
People v. Marsellus, 157 NYS 2d 148
“A notice is not ordinarily to be considered a process for all writs and process shall be under the seal of the court from which they shall issue, shall be signed by the clerk of the court thereof and shall bear the teste of the judge or the clerk.”
Chisholm v. Gilmore, 299 U.S. 99
The Court must look at both venue and jurisdiction regarding the charges. In the absence of one or the other, it creates a fundamental jurisdiction void for the case to be a valid judicial proceeding. Defendant is not a “licensee” under the MVC. Defendant is not doing any thing allegedly defined to be allowed only as a “privilege” as granted by the “licensor.” So if Defendant is not doing that thing allowed only under “license” by the “licensor,” it follows Defendant could not, and cannot be held in violation of the “licensor’s” granted privileges.
Is this a criminal matter or a civil matter? If it is civil in nature, then where is the nexus that binds her to the statute/ordinances? Where is the contract that she signed agreeing to the privilege? One cannot be forced or compelled to sign a contract in the abrogation of his/her God given rights at any time. One cannot be forced or coerced to give up a right to accept a privilege in the name of a license of any kind, unless the activity is considered illegal, immoral, or unethical. In the name of alleged licensure-based government regulatory authority and like kind of extra constitutional, hence treasonous de facto doctrines, the following authorities provide insight:
"A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful"
Payne v. Massey, 196 S.W. 2d 493; 145 Tex 237, 241
"The purpose of a license is to make lawful what would be unlawful without it."
State v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro Airports Com'n, 25 N.W. 2d 718, 725
"A license is a right granted by some competent authority to do an act which, without such a license, would be illegal."
Beard v. City of Atlanta, 86 S.E. 2d 672, 676; Ga. App.584
"A license confers the right to do that which without the license would be unlawful."
Littleton v. Burgess, 82 P. 864, 866; 14 Wyo. 173
"Generally, a license is a permit to do what, without a license, would not be lawful."
Bateman v. City of Winter Park, 37 So. 2d 362, 363; 160 Fla. 906
LICENSE
In Governmental Regulations. Authority to do some act or carry on some trade or business, in its nature lawful but prohibited by statute, except with the permission of civil authority or which would otherwise be unlawful."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary 8th Ed., 3rd Rev. Vol. 2, pg 1976 (1914)
License. ****
"A permit granted by an appropriate governmental body, generally for a consideration, to a person, firm, or corporation to pursue some occupation or to carry on some business subject to regulation under the police power. A license is not a contract between the state and the licensee, but is a mere personal permit. Rosenblatt v. California State Board of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 159 P 2d 199, 203. Neither is it property or a property right. American States Water Service Co. of California v. Johnson, 31 Cal. App. 2d 606, 88 P.2d 770, 774."
Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed. Pgs. 919, 920
To register the defendant’s automobile with the State of Michigan does not violate her Federal Constitutional Right to travel on the roads throughout the United States and its Territories. What it violates is her unalienable or inalienable rights given to her by her Creator. The Constitution only protects and secures her rights as a sovereign on the land. The Michigan Constitution does the same. Justice Douglas said:
“The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. So much is conceded by the Solicitor General. In Anglo-Saxon law that right was emerging at least as early as the Magna Carta. “ Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)
State legislators can make no claim that the public highways are property belonging to them, nor can they claim said highways are the property of any fictional instrumentality created by them. The public highways belong to the people at large. State office holders are only political trustees, holding the people's highways in political trust for the people.
The case history of the automobile shows that it has always been lawful to travel on the public roads and streets with an automobile, for it cannot be otherwise. The obvious reasons why it is lawful to travel on the public roads, by whatever means of conveyance available, is that the public roads belong to the people and are built for, and dedicated to, the purpose of common travel. The court cites are numerous:
"It is well-established law that the highways of the state are public property; and their primary and preferred use is for private purposes, ***. Stephenson v. Binford 287 U.S. 251, 264, et al
"It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen of the state." Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 165 Cal. App.534, 547
A motor vehicle requires registration and the operator to have an operator’s license. This is a commercial enterprise or venue. The supporting argument to the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction proves this definitively. The automobile is private (private property) and needs no registration to travel freely upon the highway or streets and needs no operating license to carry on ones own personal business. Notice that the word automobile does not appear in the MVC regarding licensing or the registering of motor vehicles. Isn’t that rather inconspicuous? Why? Because it concerns commercial vehicles, not privately owned automobiles. The word automobile is limited in the MVC to the automobile information disclosure act, Public Law 85-506, 15 U.S.C. 1232 or as it relates to insurance policy and drivers education. The word occurs with the… “Use of personalized automobile registration plates on a vehicle other than the vehicle for which the plates were issued…” MCL 257.803c Personalized registration plates; Notice the words “personalized automobile registration plates on a vehicle.” It refers to the plates, not the registration of the plates on a vehicle. The MVC cannot violate the rights of a sovereign or a citizen. The motor vehicle code is doing just that. It seems it is keeping the rights of the sovereign or citizen intact. The only time the MVC has jurisdiction over a sovereign is if he/she decides to accept or take an acceptance of a license by voluntarily giving up his/her right to travel. On the other hand, the legislature or the Police Powers cannot force or coerce a sovereign or citizen to relinquish that right or any unalienable right under the threat of fine and arrest without serious consequences and criminal damages.
Further, does not the plaintiff see any difference between the automobile and a motor vehicle? Then why does it clearly occur in the just adopted MCL 207.1045 new Tax refund for common fuel supply tank propelling vehicle and operating attached equipment? In section 3 it says: “3) A refund provided under this section only applies to a motor vehicle that is used by the end user exclusively for business or other commercial purposes and does not apply to an automobile whether or not it is used by the end user for business or other commercial purposes.” The motor vehicle was designed for business and commercial purposes and the automobile was designed for personal travel. The refund applies only to the motor vehicle and does not apply to the automobile.
The plaintiff’s brief cites basically only three MSC cases in his attempt to refute the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction and its supporting arguments and exhibit. For starters, the MSC has never rejected the right to travel argument on any occasion. The cases he cites have nothing to do with Anna-René: Lenau: and her status as a sovereign. The case he cites in People v Thompson, “Laurel D. Thompson was charged with failing to stop after a motor vehicle accident.” Thompson had a driver’s license and the car was registered. Another case he cites is DeVries v. Secretary of State (Reitz v. Mealy) in which Benjamin DeVries is attempting… “to compel Fred M. Alger, Jr., Secretary of State, to issue motor vehicle operator’s license.” DeVries thought by declaring bankruptcy that would absolve him of his debt to the injured party from a previous motor vehicle accident.
The prosecutor says that the motor vehicle on the public highway is subject to regulation under the police power of the state and its local government. This regulation does not include licensing or registration. Again, the cases the plaintiff cites here (People v. Thompson; Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co.; Bowerman v. Sheehan) are all addressing licensed drivers with motor vehicles that were registered. All the persons in these cases accepted a driver’s license and thus accepted the requirements of the MVC. What is interesting to note however, is the quote addressed by the plaintiff came originally from the Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co. (1917) case in which both People v. Thompson and Bowerman v. Sheehan cite. The regulation mentioned here was limited only to the public highways and not to the idea of licensing drivers, because prior to 1919, there wasn’t any mandatory drivers or operator’s license statutes in the MCL. Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co. was decided in 1917.
The Defendant and sovereign is not asking for a driver’s license or accepting a driver’s license in exchange for a privilege. As a sovereign, she has right standing before organic law with no nexus or adhesion contracts or criminal charges with the state in any way that would cause the state to have a compelling interest to make her perform or else suffer fines and criminal penalties. Now, we are approaching an apparent and serious conflict of law in this case.
The Supreme Court Decisions cited in the argument in support of the Verified Motion for Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction clearly show that one cannot exchange a right for a license, even if it has been enacted by legislation. The State of Michigan through legislation or the police powers cannot abrogate a right of any kind at any time. Can one be incarcerated for exercising an unalienable right? If one cannot be placed in a position of being forced to surrender Rights in order to exercise a privilege, how much more must this maxim of law, then, apply when one is simply exercising (putting into use) a Right?
"To be that statute which would deprive a Citizen of the rights of person or property, without a regular trial, according to the course and usage of the common law, would not be the law of the land." Hoke vs. Henderson, 15 NC 15.
and...
"We find it intolerable that one Constitutional Right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Simons vs. United States, 390 US 389.
and…
“Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate them." Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 US 436, 491.
and...
"The claim and exercise of a constitutional Right cannot be converted into a crime." Miller vs. U.S., 230 F. 486, 489.
and...
"There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of this exercise of constitutional Rights." Snerer vs. Cullen, 481 F. 946.
Have any of these decisions been overturned? Show the defendant in writing, by sworn affidavit the proof that a sovereign can be held criminally charged for exercising a right in order to obey a statute no matter how noble it may seem? This is a demand, not a request.
Here are some questions that address the heart of the matter? Questions for the Judge to answer: providing the point on how impossible it is for the legislature to enact law or by their police powers force or coerce this sovereign or citizen to violate her rights. There is no compelling reason for her to exchange a right for a privilege. It is a maxim of law that “the law does not compel to impossible ends?” These statutes/ordinances are compelling her to do the impossible if it’s true they apply to her. The legislature or the state of Michigan cannot ask a citizen to give away or abrogate their rights by obtaining or accepting a license to drive when they already have the right to travel in their privately owned automobile. The right to travel cannot be licensed anymore than religion, freedom of speech, the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances can be licensed. The following are the list of questions to answer for the record:
1.) Does Title of auto/etc. pass from seller to buyer at time of payment, absent lien-holder (s)? ANSWER: YES.
2.) Does evidence of Absolute and Perfect Title precede a Michigan Certificate of Title? ANSWER: YES.
3.) Can one obtain a Michigan Registration before receiving a Michigan Certificate of Title? ANSWER: NO.
4.) Can one obtain a Michigan Certificate of Title before surrendering Title? ANSWER: NO.
5.) Can one be compelled At Law to surrender Title to that which he/she owns free and clear? ANSWER: NO.
6.) Failing to voluntarily surrender title pursuant to threat of penalty imposed in equity, can one be compelled At Law to register auto/etc? ANSWER: NO.
7.) When does one become subject to the Michigan Motor Vehicle Statutes/Code? ANSWER: UPON APPLICATION FOR FAVOR, PRIVILEGE OR LICENSE GOVERNED BY SAID STATUTES.
8.) Are these statutes of an At Law or Equity jurisdiction/nature? ANSWER: EQUITY.
9.) Can one be compelled to abandon Rights At Law and/or to seek privileges in Equity? ANSWER: NO.
Therefore, by reason of the foregoing, the party in possession of (and to whom it is issued) Manufacturer Statement of Origin (MSO) and Bill of Sale (absent lien-holders) is the absolute owner of said method of conveyance and cannot be compelled to surrender absolute ownership or ownership documents (e.g. MSO/Document of Title). The retention of absolute ownership precludes receipt of Michigan Certificate of Registration, and said Registration is contingent upon an application for Certificate of Title (and surrender of paramount title document/MSO) which cannot be compelled At Law.
Therefore, registration/license plates VOLUNTARILY obtained by an application of a de jure citizen entering an equity jurisdiction are NOT compellable At Law, for one cannot be compelled At Law to abandon Law, nor can one be compelled by equity to enter equity.
Let’s take a look at MCL 257.301, it states: “Sec. 301. (1) Except as provided in this act, a person shall not drive a motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless that person has a valid operator's or chauffeur's license with the appropriate group designation and endorsements for the type or class of vehicle being driven or towed.” In Sec. 40 it gives the complete definition of “person.” It states: “Sec. 40. “Person” means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation and their legal successors.” In Sec. 904a it states: “Any person, not exempt from license under this act, who shall operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state and who is unable to show that he or she has been issued a license to operate a motor vehicle by any state or foreign country…” The definition of license in Sec.25 states: “License” means any driving privileges, license, temporary instruction permit, or temporary license issued under the laws of this state pertaining to the licensing of persons to operate motor vehicles.” “Driver” means in Sec. 13 “every person who drives or who is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” Are definitions important or are they trivial? It seems important in the MCL and the MVC. It goes to great lengths to define the terms they use in statutes whereas at other times they seem to be absent. Words such as citizen and sovereign are used elsewhere in the MCL, but never used alone in the MVC. Why? Because the statutes can only apply to and are restricted to the class of individuals or persons that are defined in the code. In order to be a representative, MCL 168.131 differentiates between person and citizen. One has to be a person of at least 25 years of age and be a citizen. He/she needs to be both to qualify. The statute has to define citizen or sovereign and enumerate the word or term citizen or sovereign in the statute to apply and have force and effect of law. The MVC clearly does not apply to citizens or sovereigns who have inherent powers and unalienable rights, unless of course they volunteer to waive their rights and accept a privilege. [Lawyerdude says: Anna bites off a big chunk here. She says that the motor vehicle code does not apply to citizens. Hmm.]
MCL 257.301 begins with the word “EXCEPT” and says “Except as provided in this act.” Does this mean that there are exceptions or exemptions to this particular statute? This statute applies to the one who is defined as a “person”. Does that mean that this particular statute only applies to the definition of what a person is by statute? It is clear the person described here is created by statute, not someone existing as a matter of right. By its very definition it applies only to a natural person (14th Amendment citizen with adhesion contracts to the state – a subject), firm, copartnership, association, or corporation and their legal successors. By the very nature of the terms: firm, copartnership, association, or corporation and their legal successors, are they not commercial in purpose? Does that mean the term here, “natural person” being lumped together with these commercial terms, should not also be considered a commercial entity in order to meet the scrutiny of Constitutional standards? Is the natural person here coerced by law to become a commercial enterprise when he/she applies for an operator’s license? Does the natural person as a commercial enterprise or corporation, waive his/her rights when applying for an operator’s license in order to accept a privilege to drive? Is there a difference between a natural person as defined here in the MVC and that of a sovereign or citizen? Is there a difference in how this affects a Sovereign or citizen versus the natural person defined here in this statute? Do you see corporations driving motor vehicles down the streets these days? Corporations are fictitious persons created by the state with no unalienable rights, are they not? They may have civil rights, but only those granted by the state that created them, correct? Is this virtual reality? No! These are natural persons driving motor vehicles representing the corporate fiction in a commercial venue.
Are there any rights being broken here between the natural person and the sovereign? Isn’t there an apparent form of collusion and fraud being perpetrated upon or between the natural person and the sovereign here? What does it say on the back of the vehicle owner registration certificate that the vehicle owner must sign before using it? Does it not say: “If an elected gross vehicle weight is selected, I declare this vehicle will not exceed that weight. I further certify, if I operate or employ persons to operate this commercial vehicle, the operator will be knowledgeable of the Federal and State motor carrier safety regulations.” Does that mean all personally owned automobiles purchased for private use are quickly converted into a commercial vehicle as soon as it is registered with the state? Is it not a maxim of law, that a contract between two parties has to have the consent of both and cannot be fraudulently represented? As for the registration, can you be made to sign a statement that you know to be false, realizing that your privately owned automobile is now a commercial vehicle? If the word cannot be changed on the back of the registration certificate, can one then be free to operate his/her privately owned automobile without a commercial registration? How is this to be interpreted? Are not all laws enacted by the state legislature supposed to meet the Constitutionality test and requirement? Where is all this leading us? The respondent has serious questions that need accurate answers.
"All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness."
Article II, Section 4, New Mexico Constitution
14th AMENDMENT CITIZEN?
The above citizen status is in contrast to the 14th amendment citizen. The accused in this case, being a Citizen of Michigan, is not a 14th Amendment citizen, but rather is a sovereign, as described above, as shown by the best evidence available in this case.
The 14th Amendment citizen of the United States is under federal jurisdiction. The rights of a 14th amendment citizen are very similar to the Sovereign Citizen except, instead of having inalienable rights, they are called civil rights. They are granted as privileges by the federal government and can be changed or taken away at any time. They currently are similar to the rights in the Bill of Rights except they do not include the 9th and 10th Amendments and are very limited in the rights of amendments 1 through 8. There is a clear distinction between national and State citizenship, U.S. citizenship does not entitle citizen of the privileges and Immunities of the Citizen of the State.
K. Tashiro v. Jordan, 256 P 545, affirmed 49 S Ct 47, 278 US 123.
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, agrees with the distinction between these different classes of (C)itizenship:
There are two Privileges and Immunities Clauses in the federal Constitution and Amendments, the first being found in Art. IV, and the second in the 14th Amendment. Section 1, second sentence, clause 1. The provision in Art. IV states that "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States, while the 14th Amendment provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. Note the lack of capitalization in the wording used in the 14th Amendment, this specifically means that the words "citizens, privileges, immunities" are not the same as in Article IV.
Any cases which may be cited by the plaintiff concerning 14th amendment citizens, are not applicable in this case.
For those who are not 14th amendment citizens, but are Sovereign, it is further well established that the entire body of American jurisprudence upon which governance in these United States of America are wholly dependent at the local, state, and national levels is itself wholly dependent upon political principles to include the unrebuttable presumption the people are the holders of the political power, hence are the political trustors of their states and their nation with the power of sovereigns to create, alter, or abolish their governments by and through their respective state political trust--deeds, a/k/a/ their written state constitutions, at the state level, and by and through their national political trust--deed, a.k.a. their written Constitution of the United States, at the national level.
It is an undisputed fact of American jurisprudence that the aforesaid people of Michigan can delegate no authorities or powers to their fellow citizens serving as political trustees in offices of the political trust which the people, themselves, do not possess.
It is an undisputed fact that the unalienable rights and liberties of the people of Michigan are expressed in their entirety in said people's common law of immemorial antiquity and said body of law constitutes their unwritten state constitution.
It is an undisputed fact that the unalienable rights and liberties of the people of Michigan are not limited, abbreviated, or any manner diminished to only those rights expressly declared in Article I, styled as the Declaration of Rights, of the written state constitution, inasmuch as the people are, themselves, without power and authority to derogate or abrogate their unalienable rights.
It is an undisputed fact that the aforesaid people of Michigan, have no authority to convert any of their unalienable rights or the unalienable rights of their fellow citizens into privileges, or into crimes, or otherwise derogate or abrogate said rights.
It is an undisputed fact that the members of the Michigan state legislative, executive, and judicial offices of trust serve as political trustees of the aforesaid political trust, hence have no authority to convert either their own unalienable rights or the unalienable rights of their fellow citizens into privileges or into crimes, or otherwise derogate or abrogate said rights.
Innumerable rulings of American state and federal courts may be cited, which give testimony and evidence to these self evident truths of governance in every American state, and under the national government, namely, the matter of who the inherent holders of the political power, a.k.a. the sovereigns, are in America, and the concomitant inherent limitations of said governance in America, to wit:
“All sovereign power is vested in the citizens of the state, who are limited only as expressed in the Constitution.”
State v. Shumaker, 63 A.L.R. 218, 200Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408
“Government is not sovereignty. Government is the machinery or expedient for expressing the will of the sovereign power.”
Chisholm v. Geogia, 2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 419, 472 (1793)
“[T]he sole object and only legitimate end of government is to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and when the government assumes other functions it is usurpation and oppression.”
City Council v. Kelly, 30 So. 67, 69, 142 Ala. 552 (1905)
“The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity. It thus proclaims, safeguards and preserves in basic form the pre-existing laws, rights, mores, habits and modes of thought and life of the people as developed under the common law and as existing at the adoption to the extent and as therein stated. Dean v. Paolicelli 72 S.E. 2d 506, 510; 194 Va. 219 (1952)
“Hence, it may be said with great propriety, that a constitution “measures the powers of the rulers, but it does not measure the rights of the governed;” that it is not the origin of rights, nor the fountain of law—but it is the ‘framework of the political government, and necessarily based upon the pre-existing condition of laws, rights, habits, modes of thought.”
Cooley Con. Lim., 37. Atchison & Nebraska R.R. Co. v. Baty 6 Neb. 37, 41
“There is nothing primitive about a State Constitution. It is based upon the pre-existing laws, rights, habits, and modes of thought of the people who ordained it, ***and must be construed in the light of this fact.”
Commonwealth v. City Newport News, 164 S.E. 689, 696 (1932)
“Where fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is compelling.
City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P. 2d 225, 232; 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970)
“A man may not barter away his life, freedom, or substantial rights”
(Constitution, Article 1, para.1)
[Reference here is to the New Jersey state constitution]
“The constitutional rights of liberty and property may be limited only to the extent necessary to subserve the public interest.
Cameron v. International Alliance, Etc., 176 Atl. 692, 700; 118 N.J. Eq. 11 (1935)
The state of Michigan certainly cannot show a subordinating interest which is compelling for a sovereign when MCL 257.cf (the MVC) Sections 208c Disclosure of Personal Information; 232 Furnishing list of information; 307 Application for operator’s license; 625 Arrest without warrant (due to the implied consent act) are flagrant violations of Article 1, Section 11 of the Michigan Constitution.
ß 11 Searches and seizures.
Sec. 11. The person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures. No warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any dwelling house in this state.
History: Const. 1963, Art. I, ß 11, Eff. Jan. 1, 1964.
Constitutionality: The last sentence of this section was held invalid as in conflict with U.S. Const., Amend. IV. Lucas v. People, 420 F.2d 259 (C.A. Mich. 1970); Caver v. Kropp, 306 F.Supp. 1329 (D.C. Mich. 1969); People v. Pennington, 383 Mich. 611, 178 N.W. 2d 460 (1970); People v. Andrews, 21 Mich. App. 731, 176 N.W. 2d 460 (1970).
Former Constitution: See Const. 1908, Art. II, ß 10.
Now notice how the last sentence of this Constitutional provision was ruled as invalid by the Supreme Court because it conflicts with the IV Amendment of the united States Constitution. If this particular sentence in the Constitution was ruled invalid, how much more then, does the aforementioned statutes in the MVC, be considered invalid. There is absolutely no possible way a citizen/sovereign or even a natural person can sign the application for a driver’s license or motor vehicle registration and at the same time, “the person, houses, papers and possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” “The law does not compel to impossible ends.” The person here reserves all their unalienable rights and waives none of them as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Michigan Constitution.
When the plaintiff quotes People v. Thompson (1932), he describes the police powers, “though difficult of definition, includes the power of legislation deemed essential for protection of public peace, good order, morals, safety, and health,” from Locke v. Ionia Circuit Judge and “if public welfare or public safety requires regulation of the use of such property, the otherwise private right of unrestricted use must yield to the public exigency” from People v. Smith. The court admits that police powers are “difficult of definition.” How do they regulate without crossing the line of violating someone’s unalienable rights and still maintain good order and safety? The key word here is use. The use of property is regulated by the police powers, not the thing itself. In fact, private property has never been assessed or taxed in this county at any time. It’s the use of a thing that determines the regulation. Is the use of the thing in rem commercial or private in nature? The streets, roads, highways, flow of traffic, road signs, stop lights and such all fall under the regulation of the police powers. The court however, decided both of these cases before there was an operator’s license statute. So that isn’t the contention here. There is no wording here that even implies the need for the registration of automobiles and motor vehicles or the licensing of operators in order to regulate property for the benefit of public safety, peace, and good order. Back in 1896, Joseph N. Smith (People v. Smith) was convicted of having violated the statute regulating the use of emery wheels (commercial activity). It had nothing to do with automobiles, motor vehicles, registration, or driver’s license. The same thing can be said for the Black’s Interpretation of the Law quote. It too has nothing to do with licensing or registration.
The police power can only be exercised for the purpose of promoting public rights and welfare by means of regulation, and cannot be used for taxing or obtaining and collecting revenue:
“The distinction between police power and the taxing power is clearly drawn by the authorities. * * * If [a measure] is given as a police power, it must be exercised as a means of regulation only, and cannot be used as a source of revenue.”
Robinson v. City of Norfolk, 60 S.E. 762, 764 (Va.-1908); also: Village of Lemont v. Jenks, 64 N.E. 362, 364 (Ill.-1902); 16A American Jurisprudence 2d p. 42, sec. 365.
The purpose or end result of the motor vehicle tax is that of raising revenue. However, the tax is made a condition of registration, and thus is used to regulate the use of automobiles, which can only be done under the police power. The power of the state over the right to travel on the highways extends only to regulation, not prohibition (licensing) or taxing (excise taxes). In Vernor v. Secretary of State, 179 Mich. 157,160, 146 N.W. 338, the court ruled on regulation: the legislation upon this subject is regulatory in its nature and is in the exercise of the police power of the state. The power to regulate and license does not include the power to tax.
Is the defendant being charged under the police powers of the State of Michigan? Is the alleged charge a failure to pay a license fee as an excise tax for the “privilege” of traveling in her automobile on the streets and highways owned by the citizens or people of Michigan and entrusted to the de facto State of Michigan government to maintain? This police power to collect revenue is in violation of law. Michigan police power can only be used as a regulatory measure and not a combination of both collection and regulatory measure.
Here again, the Plaintiff has neglected to or refused to answer or rebut even one single averment in Defendant’s Affirmed Demand to Dismiss for Want of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. Every averment therein is now deemed to be true as admitted. That is the law.
Perhaps the Plaintiff can enter into evidence some valid and unrebuttable information to justify the actions of the State’s police power for collecting revenue. Revenue; as excise tax in the form of vehicle registration fees, vehicle license fees and drivers license fees, among others. Each and every act of the state’s police power is oriented to collecting revenue and treating Defendant as if adjudged a criminal, without ever being tried by a court of general jurisdiction. Under protection of our constitution, a court of general jurisdiction provides for Discovery, which can determine whether Defendant is required to pay any excise tax in the form of “vehicle registration” or “vehicle license” for her private automobile. Or whether she was even required to pay an excise tax in the form of a driver’s license simply because the state acted, however covertly, to convert her unalienable right to travel; into one of an alleged “privilege”.
This, then is the Defendant in error’s focus in asserting she has a fundamental and unalienable right to travel in her automobile on the highways, streets, by ways, roads, and trails. She has a right to travel on foot, horseback, coach, bus, or in her private automobile; to conduct her personal business, in pursuit of life, liberty, property and happiness. She has an inalienable right to travel in her private automobile without requirement to pay an excise tax as “vehicle registration” or “vehicle license” fees nor the requirement for converting an existing unalienable right into a privilege in the form of a “driver’s license”.
The "right to travel upon the public highways" (alternatively described as the "ordinary use of the public road", is a plenary (legally-perfected) right. This right was cogently enumerated as an "absolute" and "fundamental right" by the Supreme Court of Kansas in Swift v. City of Topeka, 23 P. 1075 (1890), at 1076:
"Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the "law of the road". This right of the people to the use of the public streets of a city is so well established and so universally recognized in this country that it has become a part of the alphabet of fundamental rights of the citizen."
It has been universally held that the “motor vehicle tax” is a license or excise tax. See Town of Ashland v. Board of Sup’s, 117 S.E. 2d 679, 682, 202 Va. 409, Ingels v. Riley, 5 Cal. (2d) 154, 161, 53 P.2d 939; Storaasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57.
We now turn to the question, what then is the nature of a license or excise tax? An excise or privilege tax is usually confined to commercial activities. So, we look to Black’s Law Dictionary (2 Ed.) p. 942, in defining privilege tax it states:
Privilege Tax. A tax on the privileges of carrying on business for which a license or franchise is required.
Adams v. Colonial Mortgage Co., 34 So. 482, 524, 82 Miss. 263, et al.
Now, we are seeing the nature of a license tax. A license tax is a privilege tax or type of excise tax, is also of a commercial nature.
“A license tax is the sum exacted for the privilege of carrying on a particular occupation or business.”
State ex rel Arn v. Consumer Coop Ass’n, 183 P.2d 329, 423, 449, 163 Kan. 324;
Draughton v. Fox-Pelletier Co., 126 S.W. 2d 329, 333.
“A license tax is one imposed on the privilege of exercising certain callings, professions, or avocations.”
Levi v. City of Louisville, 30 S.W. 129, 132, 142 Mo. App. 373.
The application of a revenue tax cannot be used as a police power measure. The registration of automobiles in and of itself is a regulatory measure under the police power of the State. However, the excise tax levied under the Michigan Motor Vehicle Code is intimately connected with registration – the two are inseparable. Thus, the legislature is using the police power to regulate, as a means to tax citizens, which it cannot do. Again, the police power can only be exercised for the purpose of promoting public rights and welfare by means of regulation, and not for obtaining revenue.
“But, if the principle and only purpose of an act is to produce revenue, and the act now before us has that purpose alone, then the police power of the state fails. *** The exaction of a license fee with the view to revenue is not the exercise of the police power but of the power of taxation. Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (6th Ed.) 242. *** Only those cases where regulation is the primary purpose can be specially referred to the police power. Walker v. Bedford, 26 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Colo.-1933)
The tax in question is assessed and collected under the police power of the State. The respondent is not engaged in business or involved in commerce upon the public ways, nor is she a corporation or in possession of any government-granted franchise. She has taken no benefit or privilege from the state, which can be taxed as such. She has never attended public school. She was home-schooled. Thus, the tax in question is inoperative and not applicable to the Defendant in error. “The law does not compel to impossible ends.”
The motor vehicle tax provisions fail to provide for due process of law. All tax statutes that affect a citizen’s property, must be heard, before any government action can deprive the citizen of his/her liberty or property. Concerning the “payment and collection of assessments,” we have a right that the property owner have his day in court and have his ri